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INTRODUCTION
Tom’s lifelong dream is to travel through France and Italy,
participating in perfumery workshops to create his own unique scents
and enjoying the company of his family. However, at 59 years old, he
is unable to complete most everyday activities, relying on his wife as
his primary caregiver. Approximately four years ago, Tom was
diagnosed with Nonalcoholic Steatohepatitis (NASH). Because of his
extreme fatigue, constant pain, unexpected attacks of encephalopathy,
and various other health complications, he is unable to work, drive,
and otherwise live unassisted. Without a liver transplant, his quality of
life will continue to diminish while his risk of infection and death
climbs.1
As one of his final wishes, Tom wants to travel internationally
with his wife of 31 years, Lorna. But as a registered nurse, Lorna has
*

J.D., Business Law Certificate, May 2015, Chicago-Kent College of Law,
Illinois Institute of Technology; Editor-in-Chief, CHICAGO-KENT LAW REVIEW;
B.A., International Business, Lewis University. The author would like to thank
Griffin Schiele for his support throughout the past three years, including during the
writing and editing of this article.
1
This hypothetical is loosely based around the author’s personal experiences
and watching her father struggle with the symptoms of NASH.
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maxed out her annual vacation days to care for Tom during his
encephalopathic episodes. She decides to take advantage of unpaid
leave under the Family and Medical Leave Act (FMLA). She has
already used some of her FMLA leave without an issue. Given the
severity of Tom’s condition, and the short notice of the trip, Lorna
requests three weeks of FMLA leave to take care of Tom while he
travels.
Immediately after submitting the leave request, Tom and Lorna set
off for France and Italy. Lorna spends most of her time bathing and
dressing Tom, helping feed him, ensuring he remembers to hydrate
and take his handfuls of medication, wheeling him through the city in
a wheelchair, and overall providing for his every comfort. However,
she also spends a good portion of the trip visiting the Louvre,
shopping, and eating gelato with Tom.
Following a whirlwind trip, Lorna returns to work on a Monday
morning only to be contacted by Human Resources (HR) and
terminated for unexcused absences. HR stated that since she
accompanied Tom on a vacation, her leave was not protected under the
FMLA. If Lorna decides to sue her employer in the U.S. District Court
for the Northern District of Illinois, the district court and Seventh
Circuit will likely rule in her favor. However, if Lorna lives in
California and files a federal suit, her employer is more likely to
prevail on appeal to the Ninth Circuit.
Circuit courts are currently split on defining “care” under the
FMLA, especially if an employee accompanies a seriously ill family
member on a trip that appears recreational in nature. Circuit splits like
this are not unusual. However, the inequitable results are undeniable.
The FMLA is a federal law passed in 1993 to improve work-life
balance for employees, which in turn improves business productivity
because employees are happier and more loyal.2 The Act protects both
men and women should they decide to request unpaid leave from work
for the birth of a child, adoption or fostering a child, or the care of the
2

U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR, BALANCING THE NEEDS OF FAMILIES AND EMPLOYERS:
FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE SURVEYS (2000), available at
http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/cover-statement.pdf.
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employee or an employee’s family member for a “serious health
condition.”3 An eligible employee is permitted to take up to twelve
weeks of unpaid leave each year as long as he or she has been
employed by a covered employer for at least twelve months and has
worked at least 1,250 hours during that twelve-month period.4
Litigation arises in determining the legislature’s intent when using
the phrase “to care for” when an employee requests leave “to care for”
a family member. The Act does not define “care,” though Department
of Labor (DOL) regulations attempt to provide interpretations that
remain broad in nature.5 Because the regulations are broad in scope
and only provide a few examples of what care is, courts have
interpreted care differently, leading to a circuit split. Interpretations
become even more disjointed when an employee requests leave to
accompany a seriously ill family member on a trip that is unrelated to
the family member’s medical care.
Given these splits,6 a bright line rule should be utilized that takes
into account the facts of each case relating to travel under the FMLA.
A bright line rule would provide guidelines for employees and
employers in determining whether accompanying a family member on
a trip is protected by the FMLA. This in turn would decrease
employee abuse and reduce litigation for both parties. Finally, a bright
line rule would still observe the FMLA’s intent to improve employee
work-life balance. However, it would return the FMLA to its
secondary intent—to reduce unnecessary costs for employers.
Part I will discuss the FMLA, including its history and the values
that shaped the Act into what it is today. Part II analyzes the current
circuit split relating to FMLA leave “to care for” family members
while traveling for non-medical reasons. Part III analyzes and
distinguishes these circuit splits. In Part III, this Article also argues for
3

29 U.S.C.A. § 2612 (2009). There are also provisions for military leave,
though these are not the focus of this article.
4
29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(2).
5
29 C.F.R. § 825.124(a) (2013) (explaining that care covered under the
provision includes both physical and psychological care, comfort, and reassurance).
6
The current circuit splits will be discussed in depth infra Part II.
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a bright line rule on approved travel under the FMLA and provides a
draft of a suitable rule.
I. THE FAMILY MEDICAL LEAVE ACT
The FMLA was signed into law by President Bill Clinton in 1993
as a response to the work-family conflicts that had arisen with the
influx of women into the workforce.7 However, the fight for FMLA
legislation started nearly a decade earlier.
A. History of the FMLA
When Congress passed the Pregnancy Discrimination
amendments in 1978, feminist groups were already aware that
maternity-leave programs were inadequate.8 There was no national
policy on maternity leave, and existing programs did not address
family needs beyond periods of child birth.9 The turning point came in
1984 when a federal district court determined that California’s
maternity leave law discriminated against men.10
In California Federal Savings & Loan Association v. Guerra,
Lillian Garland took four months of maternity leave from her job as a
receptionist at the California Federal and Loan Association (Cal
Fed).11 However, when Garland attempted to go back to work, she was
told her job had been filled.12 Garland filed a complaint with
California’s Department of Fair Employment and Housing, charging
7

DONNA R. LENHOFF & LISSA BELL, GOVERNMENT SUPPORT FOR WORKING
FAMILIES AND FOR COMMUNITIES: FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE AS A CASE STUDY
1, available at http://www.nationalpartnership.org/research-library/workfamily/fmla/fmla-case-study-lenhoff-bell.pdf (last visited Apr. 30, 2015).
8
Id. at 3.
9
Id at 3-4.
10
Cal. Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n v. Guerra (Cal Fed), No. 83-4927R, 1984 WL
943, at *1 (C.D. Cal. Mar. 21, 1984), rev’d, 758 F.2d 390 (9th Cir. 1985), aff’d, 479
U.S. 272 (1987).
11
Cal Fed, 758 F.2d at 392.
12
Cal Fed, 479 U.S. at 278.
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that Cal Fed had violated California’s maternity leave law, which
entitled every woman to up to four months unpaid leave for pregnancy
and reinstatement to the same or similar job.13 However, before a
hearing was held, Cal Fed brought an action in federal district court
stating that California’s maternity law was inconsistent and was
preempted by Title VII.14 Cal Fed argued that the California law was a
form of sex discrimination that provided preferential treatment to
women as pregnancy was treated as a form of temporary disability.15
Employers were required to reinstate women to their jobs following
maternity leave, but disabled men were not provided this same
treatment.16
The district court found that the California law was void because
it was preempted by Title VII.17 The Ninth Circuit subsequently
reversed the lower court’s holding, and the Supreme Court affirmed
the Ninth Circuit’s decision on appeal.18 However, the district court’s
decision precipitated a meeting between various representatives of the
organized women’s movement, California Congressman Howard
Berman, and California state legislator Maxine Waters.19 Following
the meeting, a legislative proposal was outlined which became the
basis of the FMLA.20
The FMLA was drafted as a “way of ensuring that women would
not lose their jobs when newborns’ care or other family caregiving
responsibilities took them out of the workforce temporarily, and as a
way to establish protections that would apply equally to women and
men dealing with certain family circumstances or serious personal
13

Id. at 272.
Id. at 278.
15
Id. at 279.
16
Tamar Lewin, Maternity Leave: Is It Leave, Indeed?, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
1984, http://www.nytimes.com/1984/07/22/business/maternity-leave-is-it-leaveindeed.html.
17
Cal Fed, 479 U.S. 272.
18
Id.
19
LENHOFF & BELL, supra note 7, at 4.
20
Id.
14
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health conditions.”21 Drafters of the Act built in gender neutrality to
ensure legality.22 Women would not be the only ones taking time off
from work to care for new children or ill relatives, and employers
would not be able to use women’s rights “as an excuse not to hire or
promote them.”23
The initial wording of the FMLA was drafted the same year as
Cal Fed, but there was little chance that the FMLA would be
approved. At the time, Republicans were opposed to the FMLA, and
the Senate was under Republican control.24 Therefore, in order to gain
support, proponents of the Bill educated members of Congress and the
public by holding House committee hearings because the House of
Representatives was under Democratic control.25 However, to hold
hearings, the FMLA required union support. Union support slowly
increased through the organized efforts of women within unions.26
Eventually, unions “began to understand work-family issues as potent
organizing tools as well as a political issue[] . . . . By 1991, the FMLA
had become one of the top two or three demands that the labor
movement presented to Congress.”27
Despite outreach programs, public education, fundraising, and
media advertising focused on emphasizing the multifaceted needs of
employees, the FMLA Bill could not garner enough support as long as
either house of Congress was under Republican control.28 Senator
Chris Dodd introduced the Bill in the Senate in 1986, but no Senate
21

Id.
Id.
23
Id.
24
Republicans opposed the FMLA stating it was “nothing short of
Europeanization—a polite term for socialism" and that FMLA legislation would “be
the demise of some [businesses],” dimming the light of freedom. Donald Cohen, Cry
Wolf: Why the Right Was Wrong about the Family Medical Leave Act,
PRWATCH.ORG (Feb. 7, 2013), http://www.prwatch.org/news/2013/02/11973/crywolf-why-right-was-wrong-about-family-medical-leave-act#sthash.OA6ciFF8.dpuf.
25
LENHOFF & BELL, supra note 7, at 4.
26
Id.
27
Id.
28
Id. at 8.
22
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hearings, markups, or other votes were scheduled until 1987 when the
Democrats regained control of the Senate and Dodd became the
Chairman of the Children and Families Subcommittee.29 Dodd then
held a series of hearings around the country on the FMLA where he
included views of both proponents and opponents of the Bill.30
However, it was still impossible to enact the FMLA until the
Democrats held both houses and the presidency.31 Even with house
hearings in 1985 and 1986, the FMLA did not have enough support to
be brought to the House floor until 1990 or have any significant
influence on elections until the 1992 presidential election.32
B. Shaping the FMLA
Party affiliation was a large factor in shaping and passing the
FMLA. In September 1992, the FMLA Bill passed both houses of
Congress but was vetoed by President George H.W. Bush.33 The
Senate overrode the veto but only sixty percent of House
representatives voted to override, a few votes short of the two-thirds
required to override a veto.34 Of the sixty percent, eighty-two percent
of Democrats voted to override, while only twenty-three percent of
Republicans voted to override.35
The opposition’s response to the vote was also a key factor in the
FMLA’s lengthy consideration process.36 This opposition came from
primarily business lobbyists including the U.S. Chamber of
Commerce, the Society for Human Resource Management, and the
National Federation of Independent Businesses.37 These groups, as
29

Id.
Id.
31
Id. at 8-9.
32
Id. at 9.
33
Id. at 9.
34
Id.
35
Id.
36
Id. at 9.
37
Id.
30
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well as various trade associations, formed an alliance to quash the
FMLA.38 Their primary strategy was to oppose the FMLA “on
principle as a government mandate—regardless of its shape, cost, or
limitations.”39 While compromises were made in the course of the
FMLA’s path, these compromises were predominantly made by
congressional sponsors to:
woo . . . more conservative colleagues, not to achieve
business support. Several of these compromises were
significant—notably, the increase in the threshold for
coverage to fifty employees, the reduction of the number of
weeks of leave to twelve for all family and medical reasons in
a year, and the contraction in the family members covered to
only children, parents, and spouses.40
These compromises led to significant new support from Republicans;
however, they did not change the opposition from business lobbies.41
Individual lawmakers’ motivations and experiences also shaped
the FMLA process. Many highly committed politicians, including
Senators Dodd and Kit Bond and Representative Marge Roukema,
cosponsored the FMLA.42 Their efforts illustrate the factors that
affected legislators’ different responses to the FMLA, “including
personal ideology, personal experience, electoral politics, and
gender.”43 For example, Senator Dodd was not married at the time nor
did he have any children; however, he believed in the importance of
supporting children and families.44 Senator Bond became a supporter
of the FMLA in 1991 for several reasons.45 First, he wanted to please
those of his constituents most interested in the Bill, Missouri’s aging

38

Id.
Id.
40
Id.
41
Id.
42
Id. at 10.
43
Id.
44
Id.
45
Id.
39
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population.46 Second, he wanted to demonstrate his sensitivity to
women’s issues in the face of his potential reelection in 1992.47
In addition, Representative Roukema’s personal experience was a
main motivator for his support of the bill. Before being elected to
Congress, she was a stay-at-home mother and took care of her ailing
mother-in-law. She empathized with those who had to choose between
caring for a family member and leading a successful career.48 Her
experiences led her to cosponsor the FLMA and “to add the provisions
covering workers who must take leave temporarily to care for an aging
parent (spouses were added later).”49 Roukema’s support was
paramount because she was the “ranking Republican on the LaborManagement Subcommittee, which had jurisdiction over the main
portions of the FMLA in the House.”50
Other variables affecting the FMLA’s progress and structure
included changing societal beliefs on gender roles and individual
states experimenting and implementing their own family and medical
leave acts.51 Essentially though, these variables were the result of a
demographic revolution taking place over several decades.52 Over a
forty-year period, the female civilian labor force had increased by
about a million workers each year.53 Nineteen percent of women
worked in 1900 compared to seventy-four percent in 1993.54 In
addition, in 1993, fifty-six percent of mothers with children under age
six were actively working.55 Single-parent households more than
doubled between 1970 and 1988 leaving “millions of women to

46

Id.
Id.
48
Id.
49
Id.
50
Id.
51
Id. at 7-8.
52
S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 5 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 7.
53
Id.
54
Id. at 6.
55
Id.
47
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struggle as single heads of households to support themselves and their
children.”56
Another dramatic increase in 1993 included the aging American
population with twelve percent of the population comprised of
Americans aged 65 and over.57 “Between 1980 and 1990, the number
of people aged 75 or older grew by nearly one third.”58 In 1993, the
National Council on Aging estimated that “20 to 25 percent of the
more than 100 million American workers have some caregiving
responsibility for an older relative.”59 In addition, a trend away from
institutionalization led to an increase in disabled or elderly adults
being cared for primarily by their working children or parents.60
These demands caused enormous strains on individuals and
damaged national productivity, but the “need for job protected medical
leave arose long before the dramatic new changes in the workforce.”61
Workers and their families had always dealt with devastating results
when a family member lost a job for medical reasons.62 Jobs lost for
medical reasons, coupled with the demographic changes in United
States’ society, left single heads of households unable to provide for
their families.63
All of these factors, in combination with various others, led to an
extensive legislative history prior to the FMLA being signed into law
by President Bill Clinton in 1993.64 The current version of the FMLA,

56

Id.
Id. at 8.
58
Id.
59
Id. at 9.
60
Id. at 8–9.
61
Id.
62
Id.
63
Id.
64
Sarah Jane Glynn, The Family and Medical Leave Act at 20: Still Necessary,
Still Not Enough, ATLANTIC, Feb. 5, 2013,
http://www.theatlantic.com/sexes/archive/2013/02/the-family-and-medical-leaveact-at-20-still-necessary-still-not-enough/272605/.
57
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including amendments signed by President Barack Obama in 2009,65
is intended to:
balance the demands of the workplace with the needs of
families, to promote the stability and economic security of
families, and to promote national interests in preserving
family integrity. It was intended that the Act accomplish these
purposes in a manner that accommodates the legitimate
interests of employers, and in a manner consistent with the
Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in
minimizing the potential for employment discrimination on
the basis of sex, while promoting equal employment
opportunity for men and women.66
The Act was ultimately created to balance two fundamental interests:
the needs of the American workforce and the development of
businesses.67 It balances these interests by reassuring workers they will
not have to choose between themselves or their families and their
employment.68 This reassurance directly correlates with increased
worker productivity and organizational success.69
C. Provisions of the FMLA
The FMLA applies to all eligible employees70 employed by
covered employers.71 The Act provides eligible employees with two
65

Brianne Marriott, President Obama Signs Legislation Amending FMLA to
Expand Military Families' Leave Rights, LIEBERT CASSIDY WHITMORE (Nov. 13,
2009), http://www.lcwlegal.com/69653.
66
29 C.F.R. § 825.101 (2013).
67
Id.
68
Id.
69
Id.; see also S. REP. No. 103-3, at 12.
70
Eligibility is not an issue under the current circuit splits. However, I have
included a brief synopsis of the test for eligibility: Eligible employees are those who
have been employed by an employer for at least twelve months to whom the leave
request is submitted, and has worked for at least 1,250 hours during that twelvemonth period. 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(2)(A) (West 2009). The twelve months of
employment does not have to be consecutive. GERALD MAYER, CONG. RESEARCH

355
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2015

11

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 5

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 10, Issue 2

Spring 2015

types of leave: regular leave and military family leave.72 Regular leave
allows an eligible employee to take up to twelve weeks of unpaid, jobprotected leave73 during any twelve-month period, and requires
employers to maintain group health insurance benefits as if employees
continued to work instead of taking leave.74 An employee can request
leave for the following reasons:
(A) Because of the birth of a son or daughter of the employee
and in order to care for such son or daughter.
(B) Because of the placement of a son or daughter with the
employee for adoption or foster care.

SERV., THE FAMILY AND MEDICAL LEAVE ACT (FMLA): AN OVERVIEW 1 (Sept. 28,
2012), available at https://www.fas.org/sgp/crs/misc/R42758.pdf. It does not include
someone who is employed by the federal government “under subchapter V of
chapter 63 of Title 5.” 29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(2)(B)(i). It also does not apply to
employers who employ less than fifty people at a worksite if the employer employs
less than fifty people within 75 miles of the worksite. Id. § 2611(2)(B)(ii). There are
additional rules to determine whether a flight crew meets the minimum requirements
for FMLA leave. See id. § 2611(3).
71
Whether an employer is considered “covered” is not at issue under the
current circuit splits analyzed in this Article. Therefore, a general overview follows:
Both private and public sector employers are covered by the FMLA. MAYER, supra
note 70, at 4. The Act applies to private employers engaged in commerce and who
“employed 50 or more employees for at least 20 weeks in the preceding or current
calendar year.” Id. Public agencies, including federal, state and local governments,
are covered by the FMLA regardless of the number of employees. Id. While the
FMLA covers public employers regardless of the number of employees, public
employees must meet the eligibility requirements listed supra note 70.
72
MAYER, supra note 70, at 1. The FMLA was extended to military family
leave in 2008. Id. at 5. The National Defense Authorization Act created “two types
of military family leave: qualifying exigency leave and military caregiver leave.” Id.
at 5–6. This article will only focus on “regular leave.”
73
An employee may elect to substitute accrued paid leave for FMLA leave. 29
U.S.C.A. § 2612(d)(2). An employer may also require an employee to substitute
accrued paid leave for unpaid leave. Id.
74
The Family and Medical Leave Act, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR WAGE & HOUR
DIVISION, http://www.dol.gov/whd/regs/compliance/1421.htm (last visited Apr. 30,
2015).
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(C) In order to care for the spouse, or a son, daughter, or
parent, of the employee, if such spouse, son, daughter, or
parent has a serious health condition.
(D) Because of a serious health condition that makes the
employee unable to perform the functions of the position of
such employee.
(E) Because of any qualifying exigency (as the Secretary
shall, by regulation, determine) arising out of the fact that the
spouse, or a son, daughter, or parent of the employee is on
covered active duty (or has been notified of an impending call
or order to covered active duty) in the Armed Forces.75
A “serious health condition” means an illness, injury, or physical or
mental condition that involves “inpatient care at a hospital, hospice, or
residential medical facility; or continued treatment by a health care
provider.”76
The FMLA allows employees to take “intermittent” leave or work
a part-time schedule to care for their own “serious health condition(s)”
or those of an eligible relative.77 An employee on intermittent or parttime leave is not guaranteed his specific job.78 Covered employers can
temporarily transfer an employee on intermittent or part-time leave to
a position for which they are qualified and that better accommodates
75

29 U.S.C.A. § 2612.
A husband and wife who are eligible for FMLA leave and are
employed by the same covered employer may be limited to a
combined total of 12 weeks of leave during any 12–month period if
the leave is taken for birth of the employee's son or daughter or to
care for the child after birth, for placement of a son or daughter with
the employee for adoption or foster care or to care for the child after
placement, or to care for the employee's parent with a serious health
condition.
29 C.F.R. § 825.120(a)(3) (2013).
76
29 U.S.C.A. § 2611(11)(A)-(B).
77
MAYER, supra note 70, at 5. Intermittent leave for (A) and (B) is prohibited
unless an alternative agreement is reached between employer and employee.
§2612(b)(1).
78
Id. § 2612(b)(2).
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their changed hours.79 However, the new position “must provide the
employee with the same pay and benefits.”80 Once an employee
returns to full-time status, the employer must provide the employee
with his or her previous position, or an equivalent position.81
In order to qualify for FMLA leave, an employee must notify his
or her employer if he plans to take leave. If the leave is foreseeable,
employees must provide at least 30 days notice before the start of the
leave.82 For planned medical treatment, the employee must consult
with the employer and make a reasonable effort to schedule the
treatment at a time that is not disruptive to the employer’s
operations.83
If leave is not foreseeable, an employee must notify his employer
“as soon as practicable.”84 “As soon as practicable” is defined as:
as soon as both possible and practical, taking into account all
of the facts and circumstances in the individual case. When
an employee becomes aware of a need for FMLA leave less
than 30 days in advance, it should be practicable for the
employee to provide notice of the need for leave either the
same day or the next business day. In all cases, however, the
determination of when an employee could practicably
provide notice must take into account the individual facts and
circumstances.85
It is relatively easy for most employees to argue that the 30 days
notice requirement does not apply to their leave request. As long as
they are unaware when leave will be required to begin or there is a
change in circumstances, the 30 days notice is not required.86

79

Id.
MAYER, supra note 70, at 5.
81
Id.
82
29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(e).
83
29 U.S.C.A. § 825.302(e) (2013).
84
29 U.S.C.A. § 2612(e).
85
29 C.F.R. § 825.302(b).
86
29 C.F.R. § 825.302(a).
80
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If leave is for a “serious health condition,” either the employee’s
own or an immediate family member’s, the employer may require
certification from a health care provider.87 If a certification is returned
incomplete or insufficient, the employer “shall advise [the]
employee . . . and shall state in writing what additional information is
necessary to make the certification complete and sufficient.”88 If
deficiencies are not cured, the employer may deny the FMLA leave.89
Failure to return a certification constitutes a failure to provide
certification and the employer may also deny the leave.90
An employer may request a recertification no more than every
thirty days and “only in connection with an absence by the
employee.”91 If the medical certification indicates that the duration of
the “serious health condition” is longer than thirty days, then the
employer must wait until that duration expires before requesting a
recertification. For example, if the certification states that the
“employee will be unable to work” for forty days, then the “employer
must wait forty days before requesting a recertification.”92

87

29 C.F.R. § 825.305(a).
29 C.F.R. 825.305(c). A certification is considered incomplete if one or
more applicable entries have not been completed. A certification is insufficient if the
information provided to the employer is vague, ambiguous or non-responsive.
89
Id.
90
Id.
91
Recertification, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR,
http://webapps.dol.gov/elaws/whd/fmla/12a5.aspx (last visited Apr. 30, 2015).
92
Id. A recertification can be requested in less than thirty days if the employee
requests an extension of his leave, circumstances have changed significantly and the
previous certification no longer applies, or the employer receives information that
questions the validity or reason for leave. Unless the employer provides more lax
rules than the minimum requirements provided in the Act, the same certification
requirements apply to recertification, including timeframes for supplying
recertification, the potential denial of FMLA leave protections if recertification is not
provided, and who covers the cost for recertification (the employee).
88
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II. CIRCUIT SPLITS REGARDING CARE WHILE TRAVELING UNDER THE
FMLA
Another frequently litigated area of the Act is defining “to care
for”93 when taking leave to care for a family member with a “serious
health condition.”94 Under DOL regulations, the FMLA encompasses
both physical and psychological care of a family member with a
“serious health condition.”95 The regulation language does not purport
to place limitations on this care and includes nonexclusive examples.96
An employee may request leave if a “family member is unable to care
for his or her own basic medical, hygienic, or nutritional needs or
safety” or to provide “psychological comfort and reassurance which
would be beneficial to a child, spouse or parent with a ‘serious health
condition’ who is receiving inpatient or home care.”97 The phrase “to
care for” also encompasses situations where an employee may be
needed to substitute for others who normally care for the family
member, to make arrangements for changes in care, or where care
responsibilities are shared with another member or a third party.98
An employee may also “obtain . . . leave . . . to provide ‘indirect
care’ in support of such a leave.”99 Courts generally do not believe this
category is included in the FMLA.100 Examples of indirect care
93

29 U.S.C.A. § 2612 (West 2009).
Michael D. Homans, Primer on What the Family and Medical Leave Act
Covers: Litigating FMLA Claims 11 (4th Annual ABA Section of Labor and
Employment Law Conference Paper Nov. 3-6, 2010), available at
http://www.flastergreenberg.com/media/article/289_Primer_on_What_the_Family_a
nd_Medical_Leave_Act_Covers.pdf.
95
29 C.F.R. § 825.124(a).
96
Id. The regulation uses language such as “it includes situations where, for
example,” and “[t]he term also includes.” This language does not include exclusive
or limiting language.
97
Id.
98
29 C.F.R. § 825.124(b)-(c).
99
Id.
100
Jeff Nowak, Did a Court Just Allow an Employee FMLA Leave to Care for
Her Grandchild?, FMLA INSIGHTS (July 11, 2014),
94
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include an employee’s presence at a hospital while a family member
undergoes surgery101 and physical care that is too far removed from
the family member’s illness.102
Drawing a line between direct and indirect care is especially
difficult when an employee is traveling with a family member who
requires care. This line drawing is something circuit courts have
grappled with, and to date, there is no bright line rule from either the
DOL or the federal courts. The remainder of this section will review
and analyze the current circuit court split regarding travel under the
FMLA.
A. Ninth Circuit: “To Care for” when Traveling
In 1999, the Ninth Circuit decided Marchisheck v. San Mateo
County.103 In Marchisheck, Plaintiff Fe Castro Marchisheck sued San
Mateo County for violating the FMLA when it terminated
Marchisheck’s employment after she took a one-month leave from
work to move her son to the Philippines.104
Marchisheck was a senior medical technologist at San Mateo
County General Hospital who was also raising her fourteen-year-old
son, Shaun.105 Shaun began undergoing counseling in 1991 after a
shoplifting incident, and his doctor found he was mildly depressed and
had poor peer relations.106 Later, a psychological assistant concluded
http://www.fmlainsights.com/did-a-court-just-allow-an-employee-fmla-leave-tocare-for-her-grandchild/.
101
Fioto v. Manhattan Woods Golf Enterprises, L.L.C., 270 F. Supp. 2d 401
(S.D.N.Y. 2003), aff’d, 123 F. App’x 26 (2d Cir. 2005) (court ruled against
employee who took time off to be at the hospital for his mother’s brain surgery).
102
Lane v. Pontiac Osteopathic Hosp., No. 09-12634, 2010 U.S. Dist. LEXIS
61003 (E.D. Mich. June 21, 2010) (flooding in mother’s basement was not direct
care despite mother having hepatitis and the flooding’s potential for breeding
disease).
103
199 F.3d 1068 (9th Cir. 1999).
104
Id. at 1070.
105
Id.
106
Id.
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he had a “parent-child relationship problem” but did not believe Shaun
suffered from attention deficit disorder or post-traumatic stress
disorder.107
In August 1995, Shaun was assaulted by several acquaintances.108
“Shaun lost consciousness during the attack and suffered a nasal
contusion, two puncture burns on his back, abrasions, erythema on the
right side of his neck, and a left lateral subconjunctival
hemorrhage.”109 Following the assault, Marchisheck decided to move
Shaun to the Philippines to live with her brother.110 Marchisheck made
a written request for approximately five weeks of vacation leave, but
the request was denied as it would be impossible for the hospital to
cover all of her shifts without authorizing overtime.111 The day before
the trip, she met with supervisors at the hospital to discuss her
vacation request.112 Marchisheck submitted a letter written by a
psychiatrist from the clinic Shaun visited; however, the vacation
request was still denied.113 Despite the denial, Marchisheck left the
country.114 She was terminated in September 1995.115
Marchisheck filed suit and the district court granted the
defendant’s motion for summary judgment based on Shaun not having
a “serious health condition.”116 She appealed to the Ninth Circuit, and
the Ninth Circuit affirmed the district court’s decision.117 The Ninth
Circuit concluded that Shaun’s past medical history did not fall into
the defined parameters of a “serious health condition.”118 However, the
107

Id. at 1071.
Id.
109
Id.
110
Id.
111
Id.
112
Id. at 1072.
113
Id.
114
Id.
115
Id.
116
Id. at 1073.
117
Id.
118
Id. at 1073-74.
108
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court went on to explain that even if Shaun had a “serious health
condition,” Marchisheck did not have FMLA protection because the
leave was not “to care for” Shaun.119
Regulation 29 C.F.R. § 825.116(a) defines “to care for” as “both
physical and psychological care.”120 Marchisheck’s purpose in moving
Shaun was to keep him safe from further beatings, not to receive
medical or psychological treatment.121 Marchisheck did not have
specific plans to seek medical treatment for Shaun when they reached
the Philippines, and Shaun did not see a doctor for more than five
months following the move.122 The district court concluded that
“‘caring for’ a child with a ‘serious health condition’ involves some
level of participation in ongoing treatment of that condition.”123
However, participation in ongoing treatment was not present in
Marchisheck’s case.
The Ninth Circuit also found an employee must be in “close and
continuing proximity” to the ill family member.124 In Tellis v. Alaska
Airlines, Inc., the court affirmed summary judgment in favor of the
defendant employer because the employee took FMLA leave to care
for his wife who was having difficulties with her pregnancy.125
However, his car broke down during leave, and instead of caring for
his wife, he flew from Seattle to Atlanta to pick up a car he owned
there.126 While he was driving back to Seattle, his wife gave birth to a
baby girl.127 Alaska Airlines decided to terminate him for unexcused
absences and Tellis filed suit.128 He argued that the care he provided to
119

Id. at 1076.
Id.
121
Id.
122
Id.
123
Id.
124
Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 414 F.3d 1045 (9th Cir. 2005) (citing
Scamihorn v. Gen. Truck Drivers, 282 F.3d 1078, 1087-88 (9th Cir. 2002).
125
Id. at 1046.
126
Id.
127
Id.
128
Id.
120
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his wife was consistent with the FMLA “because his trip to Atlanta
and back to retrieve the family car provided psychological reassurance
to her that she would soon have reliable transportation, and his phone
calls to her while he drove back to Seattle provided moral support and
psychological comfort.”129 The court disagreed stating that providing
care to a family member requires actual care, which was not
present.130 An employee must participate at some level in ongoing
treatment of the “serious health condition” and be in close and
continuing proximity with the ill family member.131
The Ninth Circuit outlined what is currently the definition of
“close and continuing proximity” in Scamihorn v. General Truck
Drivers. In that case, a son moved to his father’s town for a month to
help him cope with depression.132 The son spoke with his father daily,
performed household chores, and drove his father to the counselor.133
The court concluded that the plaintiff “participated in the treatment
through both his daily conversations with his father . . . and his
constant presence in his father's life.”134
B. First Circuit: “To Care for” while Traveling
In Tayag v. Lahey Clinic Hospital, Inc., the First Circuit affirmed
summary judgment for an employer following an employee’s
unapproved leave.135 In Tayag, the employee requested seven weeks of
leave to accompany her ailing husband on a spiritual healing
129

Id. at 1046-47.
Id. at 1047.
131
Id.
132
Scamihorn, 282 F.3d at 1080-81 (9th Cir. 2002).
133
Id. at 1081.
134
Id. at 1088; see also Brunelle v. Cytec Plastics, Inc., 225 F.Supp.2d 67, 77
& n.13 (D. Me. 2002) (denying employer's summary judgment motion when plaintiff
provided care and comfort to his critically ill father); Briones v. Genuine Parts Co.,
225 F.Supp.2d 711, 715-16 (E.D. La. 2002) (denying employer's summary judgment
motion when employee took leave to care for healthy children while his wife cared
for their hospitalized child).
135
Tayag v. Lahey Clinic Hosp., Inc., 632 F.3d 788 (1st Cir. 2011).
130
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pilgrimage to the Philippines.136 Tayag’s husband suffered from
“serious medical conditions, including gout, chronic liver and heart
disease, rheumatoid arthritis, and kidney problems that led to a
transplant in 2000.”137 These debilitating conditions left Tayag as her
husband’s primary care giver.138 She transported him to medical
appointments, helped him with daily activities, and provided
psychological comfort.139
Tayag worked for Lahey Clinic Hospital (Lahey) as a health
management clerk and had her requests for leave consistently
approved.140 Leave requests usually lasted one to two days.141 In June
2006, Tayag submitted a vacation request form for approximately
seven weeks to begin in August.142 Her supervisor stated this would
leave the department with inadequate coverage, but because Tayag
indicated her husband would need medical care, her supervisor
provided paperwork for an FMLA leave request.143 She later requested
FMLA leave to assist her husband while he traveled, but she did not
inform Lahey that the travel was for spiritual pilgrimage.144
Tayag’s husband underwent an angioplasty, and Tayag provided a
certification from her husband’s primary care physician stating that
Tayag would need to receive medical leave “to accompany Mr. Tayag
on any trips as he needs physical assistance on a regular basis.”145
However, her husband’s cardiologist returned a certification the
following month “stating that [her husband] was ‘presently . . . not
incapacitated’ and that Tayag would not need leave.”146 Lahey sent
136

Id.
Id. at 789.
138
Id.
139
Id.
140
Id.
141
Id. at 790.
142
Id.
143
Id.
144
Id.
145
Id.
146
Id.
137
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letters to Tayag and left her phone messages to notify her that the leave
for the trip was unapproved; however, Tayag did not receive the
notifications because she was in the Philippines.147 Receiving no
response, Lahey then terminated her employment.148
While in the Philippines, the Tayags “went to Mass, prayed, and
spoke with the priest and other pilgrims at the Pilgrimage of Healing
Ministry at St. Bartholomew's Parish.”149 They also visited other
churches as well as friends and family.150 Mr. Tayag received no
conventional medical treatment and did not see any physicians while
in the Philippines.151 However, Tayag assisted her husband by
“administering medications, helping him walk, carrying his luggage,
and being present in case his illnesses incapacitated him.152
Several months after termination, Tayag filed suit alleging that her
termination violated the FMLA.153 The district court granted summary
judgement in favor of Lahey, determining that the Tayags’ trip was not
protected because it was a vacation.154 On appeal, the circuit court
reviewed the FMLA regulations, noting that regulations do address
faith healing, but only faith healing practitioners “capable of providing
health care services.”155 These include Christian Science practitioners
subject to certain conditions.156 Tayag did not invoke the Christian
Science exception, instead relying on a constitutional claim.157 The
circuit court concluded that the pilgrimage did not constitute “medical
care” and that the FMLA definition of care did not extend to cover the

147

Id.
Id.
149
Id.
150
Id.
151
Id.
152
Id.
153
Id.
154
Id. at 790-91.
155
Id. at 791.
156
Id.
157
Id.
148

366
https://scholarship.kentlaw.iit.edu/seventhcircuitreview/vol10/iss2/5

22

Collinet: Gambling on Court Interpretations of Care: Approving Leave for Tr

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 10, Issue 2

Spring 2015

potential for “psychological comfort and reassurance” on lengthy trips
unrelated to medical care.158
C. Seventh Circuit: “To Care for” while Traveling
1. Background
In contrast, the Seventh Circuit case, Ballard v. Chicago Park
District, suggests that care associated with FMLA leave need not take
place at home.159 In Ballard, Beverly Ballard was a swimming
instructor for the Chicago Park District and requested FMLA leave to
care for her dying mother who had begun receiving hospice support.160
Ballard lived with her mother and acted as her primary caregiver.
Ballard’s daily responsibilities included cooking her mother’s meals,
administering her insulin and other medication, draining fluids from
her heart, and bathing and dressing her.161 A local charitable
organization granted Ballard’s mother’s “make a wish” request to
travel to Las Vegas.162 Ballard requested six days of FMLA leave to
care for her mother during the trip but her employer denied the
leave.163 Ballard allegedly attempted to contact her supervisor several
times by phone and fax to no avail.164
Despite the denial, Ballard went on the trip anyway, taking care of
her mother on the trip as well as “playing slots, shopping on the Strip,
people-watching, and dining at restaurants.”165 Ballard acknowledged
that her mother was not in Las Vegas for any kind of medical care,

158

Id. at 793.
Ballard v. Chic. Park Distr., 900 F. Supp. 2d 804, 806 (N.D. Ill. 2012),
aff’d, 741 F.3d 838 (7th Cir. 2014)
160
Ballard, 741 F.3d at 839.
161
Id.
162
Id.
163
Id. at 839-40.
164
Ballard, 900 F. Supp. 2d at 806–07.
165
Id. at 807.
159
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therapy, or other treatment; it was a vacation specifically requested by
her mother.166
Ballard returned to work a day later than requested on her leave
form because a fire had broken out at the Las Vegas hotel that Ballard
and her mother were staying.167 The fire prevented her from making
her original flight home.168 Almost two months later, Ballard was
terminated for her unexcused absences related to the Las Vegas trip.169
She then filed suit.170
2. The District Court’s Findings
The U.S. District Court for the Northern District of Illinois issued
an opinion on the employer’s motion for summary judgment. Ballard
alleged that “the Park District willfully and intentionally interfered
with her rights under the FMLA by denying her request for leave to
accompany her sick mother to Las Vegas and then firing her for
absences in connection with the trip.”171 The Chicago Park District
argued that the FMLA did not protect Ballard’s trip because there were
no plans to seek medical treatment in Las Vegas; the care “must have
some connection to the family member’s need for treatment itself.”172
The district court reviewed two issues, one legal and one factual:
whether Ballard was entitled to leave under the FMLA “to care for”
her mother while in Las Vegas and whether Ballard provided sufficient
notice of her intent to take FMLA leave.173 The court analyzed the first
issue under two theories: “first, whether [Ballard] ‘cared for’ her

166

Id.
Id.
168
Id.
169
Id.
170
Id.
171
Id. at 808.
172
Id.
173
Id.
167
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mother during the trip to Las Vegas; and second, in the alternative,
whether the trip itself was part of her mother's ‘ongoing treatment.’”174
In analyzing the issue, the court reviewed the text of the FMLA,
which did not set forth the limitation that the care must have a
connection to the treatment.175 The text of the Act entitles an eligible
employee to a certain amount of leave “‘[i]n order to care for . . . [a]
parent of the employee, if such . . . parent has a serious health
condition.’”176 To be covered by the Act, a family member must have a
“serious health condition” and the leave must be used to care for the
family member.177 The FMLA “does not mention the employee's direct
participation in medical treatment. Nor does the statute mention
limiting the care to when the parent is at a particular location.”178 “To
care for” is not explicitly defined in the Act; however, the DOL defines
the phrase in 29 C.F.R. § 825.116.179 The phrase is defined as:
encompass[ing] both physical and psychological care, and
includes situations where, for example, because of a serious
health condition, the family member is unable to care for his
or her own basic medical, hygienic, or nutritional needs or
safety, or is unable to transport himself or herself to the
doctor, etc. The term also includes providing psychological
comfort and reassurance which would be beneficial to . . . a
parent with a serious health condition who is receiving
inpatient or home care.180
Therefore, “caring for” a family member is not dependent on a
particular location or participation in medical treatment.181
Further, the regulations recognize that a “serious health condition”
need only involve continuing treatment under the supervision of a
174

Id.
Id.
176
Id.
177
Id.
178
Id. at 808-09.
179
Id. at 809.
180
Id.
181
Id.
175
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medical provider, not active treatment.182 This is especially the case
for terminally ill family members who may not be receiving active
medical treatment (i.e., Alzheimer's, a severe stroke, or the terminal
stages of a disease).183
The court went on to analyze the regulations, stating that the
regulations were created based on legislative history of the FMLA.
The Senate Report on the FMLA even stated:
An employee could also take leave to care for a parent . . . of
any age who is unable to care for his or her own basic
hygienic or nutritional needs or safety. Examples include a
parent or spouse whose daily living activities are impaired by
such conditions as Alzheimer's disease, stroke, or clinical
depression, or . . . who is in the final stages of a terminal
illness.184
Therefore, the court concluded, based on statutory and regulatory text,
that Ballard’s mother suffered from a “serious health condition” and
was unable to care for her own basic needs.185 In addition, the services
that Ballard provided her mother constituted physical care within the
meaning of the FMLA.186 Logically then, Ballard also “cared for” her
mother during their trip to Las Vegas as her mother’s physical needs
did not change.187
The Park District attempted to persuade the court that there must
be an “ongoing treatment” connection by citing to the cases described
above, specifically the Ninth Circuit's decision in Marchisheck.188 The
court agreed that the Marchisheck’s decision was reasonable: “that
‘caring for’ must involve treatment from a medical provider when the
employee is taking FMLA leave, including when the family member is
182

Id.
Id.
184
Id. (citing S. REP. No. 103–3, at 24 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N.
3, 26.)
185
Id. at 810.
186
Id.
187
Id.
188
Id.
183
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traveling away from home.”189 However, the district court refused to
follow the Ninth Circuit’s decision because it was not based on the
statutory and regulatory text.190 Further, the limitation adopted by the
Ninth Circuit—some level of participation in ongoing treatment is
required for FMLA leave protections—is not grounded in the
regulatory text.191 The regulation gives two examples of “caring for” a
family member:
(1) “where . . . the family member is unable to care for his or
her own basic medical, hygienic, or nutritional needs or
safety, or is unable to transport himself or herself to the
doctor”; and (2) “providing psychological comfort and
reassurance which would be beneficial to a child, spouse, or
parent with a serious health condition who is receiving
inpatient or home care.” . . . Nothing in these examples
suggest that “care” must itself be part of ongoing medical
treatment.192
The district court went on to review a case, which the Ninth
Circuit analyzed more in depth, Gradilla v. Ruskin Manufacturing.193
In Gradilla, Gradilla accompanied his wife to Mexico to attend her
father’s funeral.194 He was his wife’s primary care giver, and he was
responsible for administering her medication for a serious heart
condition as well as ensuring she did not exacerbate her condition
under stressful events.195 Ruskin fired Gradilla, and Gradilla filed suit
under the California Family Rights Act (analogous to the FMLA).196
Citing Marchisheck, the Ninth Circuit:
189

Id.
Id.
191
Id.
192
Id. at 811.
193
Id. The Gradilla case opinion was withdrawn.
194
Id. (citing Gradilla v. Ruskin Mfg., 320 F.3d 951 (9th Cir. 2003),
withdrawn per stipulation of parties by Gradilla v. Ruskin Mfg., 328 F.3d 1107 (9th
Cir. 2003).
195
Id. (citing Gradilla, 320 F.3d at 954).
196
Id.
190
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held that under the CFRA, ‘an employee who leaves work to
travel with and care for a family member with a serious
health condition is not entitled to leave when the family
member decides, in spite of her serious medical condition, to
travel away from her home for reasons unrelated to her
medical treatment.’197
The Ninth Circuit’s opinion placed “a geographic restriction on where
‘care’ must be administered, at least when the trip away from home
does not have a medical-treatment purpose.”198
Gradilla relied on the same regulation at issue as all the abovestated cases, 29 C.F.R. § 825.116, to create a geographic limitation.
However, the rule only provides examples of care that would qualify
and does “not purport to limit where ‘care’ can take place.”199 The
District Court concluded that it would be a mistake to use a list of nonexclusive examples within the regulation to place limitations on the
broad definition.200 As long as the employee provides care to the
family member, the location of the care has no bearing on whether the
employee receives FMLA protections.201
The District Court then reviewed the issue of Ballard’s entitlement
to FMLA leave under an alternative theory: whether Ballard provided
sufficient evidence for a fact finder to conclude that the trip served a
medical purpose.202 Ballard provided both a letter from Horizon
Hospice stating that it had helped to arrange her mother’s end-of-life
trip as well as an affidavit from an employee at Horizon Hospice.203
However, the court concluded that Ballard could not use the letter as
evidence because it was a letter written seven months following the
trip and was inadmissible hearsay. In addition, the affidavit could not

197

Id. (quoting Gradilla, 320 F.3d at 953) (emphasis omitted).
Id. at 811.
199
Id. at 811-12.
200
Id. at 812.
201
Id.
202
Id. at 812-13.
203
Id.
198
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be used because it did not adequately set forth facts demonstrating the
trip was in connection with ongoing treatment at Horizon Hospice.204
Finally, the court analyzed whether Ballard provided sufficient
notice of her intent to take leave. The court quickly determined that 30
days notice is only required when the leave is foreseeable.205 If Ballard
was held to this heavier burden, Ballard alleged sufficient facts to meet
the requirement—she stated that she approached her supervisor over a
month before the leave was to begin.206 The Park District argued that
Ballard’s notice was insufficient because it failed to comply with the
Park District’s internal procedures for requesting leave.207 However,
even if true, “‘failure to follow . . . internal employer procedures will
not permit an employer to disallow or delay an employee's taking
leave if the employee gives timely verbal or other notice.’”208
3. The Seventh Circuit’s Decision
The Park District moved for an interlocutory appeal to the
Seventh Circuit. The Seventh Circuit affirmed the district court’s
decision, noting that it did not matter where Ballard provided the care,
as long as she was providing care to her mother.209 The Seventh
Circuit rejected the Park District’s argument that an employee should
only be able to invoke the FMLA protections if an away-from-home
trip is for services provided in connection with ongoing medical
treatment.210 The court based its opinion on a literal reading of the text
of the statute.211 First, 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C) uses the word “care,”
not “treatment” when describing leave to take care of a family member

204

Id. at 813.
Id.
206
Id.
207
Id.
208
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.302(d) (2013)).
209
Ballard, 741 F.3d at 843.
210
Id. at 840.
211
Id.
205
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with a “serious health condition.”212 Second, the Park District did not
explain why participation in ongoing treatment was required for awayfrom-home care versus at-home care.213 The text of the FMLA does
not restrict care geographically (i.e., it does not say that “an employee
is entitled to time off ‘to care at home for’ a family member”).214 Its
only limitation is that a family member must have a “serious health
condition” for an employee to be able to take advantage of FMLA
protections.215
The court went on to state that the FMLA does not define care,
and therefore, it must review DOL regulations.216 Since there are no
regulations interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 2612(a)(1)(C), the court looked to
the regulations interpreting 29 U.S.C. § 2613(b)(4)(A) regarding
health-care provider certification.217 The court found nothing in the
regulations supporting the Park District’s argument.218 The regulations
define care expansively and without any geographic limitation. The
“only part of the regulations suggesting that the location of care might
make a difference is the statement that psychological care ‘includes
providing psychological comfort and reassurance to [a family
member] . . . who is receiving inpatient or home care.’”219 However, as
the district court observed, the examples provided in the regulations
are not purported to be exclusive. In addition, the example regarding a
potential geographic location only related to psychological care and
did not include physical care.220 Therefore, the court concluded that
Ballard’s mother’s basic physical needs did not change while in Las

212

Id.
Id.
214
Id.
215
Id.
216
Id. at 841.
217
Id.
218
Id.
219
Id. (quoting 29 C.F.R. § 825.116(a) (2008)).
220
Id.
213
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Vegas and Ballard’s care was actually quite important when a fire at
the hotel made it impossible to reach their room.221
The Park District cited a series of circuit court cases to support its
claims; however, the Seventh Circuit rejected these cases because they
are not grounded in the text of the statute or regulations.222 It did
review the Marchisheck case, as the district court did, agreeing that the
Marchisheck court’s conclusion did not make sense.223 The Seventh
Circuit stated:
The relevant rule says that, so long as the employee attends to
a family member's basic medical, hygienic, or nutritional
needs, that employee is caring for the family member, even if
that care is not part of ongoing treatment of the condition.
Furthermore, none of the cases explain why certain services
provided to a family member at home should be considered
“care,” but those same services provided away from home
should not be. Again, we see no basis for that distinction in
either the statute or the regulations.224
Finally, the Park District expressed concern over the court’s
decision should it find in favor of Ballard.225 If the court ruled in
Ballard’s favor, the Park District stated, it would be setting a precedent
where employees could help themselves to unpaid FMLA leave in
order to take personal vacations by bringing seriously ill family
members along.226 The court concluded that this concern was
unwarranted because this case’s circumstances fell under hospice and
palliative care.227 In addition, employers concerned about abuse could
require certification by the family member’s health care provider, who
would certify that the family member needs physical or emotional

221
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assistance and thus the employer should allow employee leave
protected by the FMLA.228
III. CREATING A BRIGHT-LINE RULE ON TRAVELING UNDER THE FMLA
The Seventh Circuit’s decision focused on the absurdity of the
Chicago Park District’s, as well as the First and Ninth Circuits’,
interpretations of “to care for.” If Ballard had requested leave to care
for her mother in Chicago, or if her mother lived in Las Vegas and she
was traveling there to care for her, Ballard’s request would have fallen
within the scope of the FMLA.229 Yet, under the Park District’s
contentions, because Ballard traveled with her terminally-ill mother,
on a trip that did not include ongoing medical treatment, she used her
FMLA leave illicitly.230
The only case that is factually similar to Ballard, is Tayag in the
First Circuit. Both family members suffered from “serious health
conditions”; the employees accompanied the family member on a trip,
taking care of their physical and psychological needs; and the trips
were not for, and did not include, medical treatment.231 However, the
defining characteristic between the two court’s decisions is that
Ballard’s mother was receiving palliative and hospice care outside of
the trip, while Tayag’s husband was not terminally ill.
In contrast, Marchisheck appropriately denied relief because the
plaintiff’s trip was to accompany her teenage son in moving him to the
Philippines.232 He did not have a “serious health condition”; however,
what is relevant here is the court’s decision to analyze the case as if
plaintiff’s son had a “serious health condition.”233 Regulation 29
C.F.R. § 825.116(a) defines “to care for” as “both physical and
228

Id.
Id.
230
Id. at 840.
231
Compare Tayag v. Lahey Clinic Hosp., Inc., 632 F.3d 788, 788-89 (1st Cir.
2011), with Ballard, 741 F.3d at 839.
232
Marchisheck v. San Mateo Cty., 199 F.3d 1068, 1070 (9th Cir. 1999).
233
Id. at 1076.
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psychological care.”234 From a reading of the Marchisheck facts,
plaintiff’s physical and psychological care of her adult son, if he had a
“serious health condition,” should have been enough under the
Seventh Circuit’s analysis. Plaintiff’s purpose in traveling with her
minor son was to move him to the Philippines. If her care during the
trip included day-to-day care, then this case should have fallen well
within the FMLA according to the Seventh Circuit as day-to-day care
of as seriously ill family member is sufficient. Yet, the court still
concluded that the controlling factor was that care required some level
of participation in ongoing treatment.235
Similarly, Tellis appropriately denied relief. Allowing a man to
travel to pick up a car while his pregnant wife remained home would
drastically expand the definition of “to care for.”236 Psychological
reassurance from afar is not the same as actual care while traveling
with a family member who has a “serious health condition.”237
Despite these distinctions, a circuit split remains—one that may
widen as additional circuits are required to interpret the FMLA when
an eligible employee travels with a seriously ill family member. A
bright line rule, drafted to account for the factual circumstances in
each case discussed above, yet preventing too broad of an
interpretation as in Ballard, would reduce litigation and further the
legislative intent of the FMLA.
A. Drafting Language to Resolve the Circuit Split
When drafting language to resolve the current circuit split, current
case law should be taken into consideration, including factual
distinctions between Ballard, Tayag, Marchisheck, and Tellis. For
example, the proposed language below modifies 29 C.F.R. § 825.116
and takes into consideration the various conclusions of the First,
Seventh, and Ninth Circuits:
234

Id.
Id.
236
Tellis v. Alaska Airlines, Inc., 414 F.3d 1045, 1047 (9th Cir. 2005).
237
Id.
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Needed to care for a family member or covered
servicemember while traveling
(A) An employee must provide direct, in-person care for a
seriously ill family member when traveling in order for leave
to come under the protections of the FMLA.
(B) Traveling with a seriously ill family member or covered
servicemember receiving medical care is protected by the
Act.
(C) In addition to meeting the requirements of section (A), in
order to fall under the protections of the Act, travel for other
reasons must meet the following criteria:
a. Travel must be primarily organized by (1) hospice or
palliative care; (2) a social worker or medical professional;
(3) a 501(c)(3) or 501(c)(4) organization that specifically
organizes trips for seriously ill individuals; and
b. A physician must provide, to the employer, as detailed
in subsection (D), information related to the physical
and/or psychological care the employee would be
providing to the seriously ill family member or covered
servicemember while traveling. Examples of physical and
psychological care include:
i. Providing psychological support when an
individual is receiving hospice or palliative care;
ii. Providing physical help with feeding, bathing,
dressing, transportation and other daily activities;
(D) Certification for travel under the FMLA must include the
following:
a. An explanation of the trip and a statement that the
employee will be providing physical or psychological care
to the seriously ill family member, including attestation
that the trip is primarily being organized by a social
worker, medical professional, or authorized representative
from a hospice or palliative center or not-for-profit
organization that specifically organizes trips for seriously
378
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ill individuals, accompanied by the signature and contact
information of an authorized person listed under
subsection (C)a
b. In addition to the requirements of certification under 29
U.S.C.A. § 2613 and 29 C.F.R. §825.306, a physician
must also include the following information in the
certification
i. Location of travel
ii. Specific examples of physical or psychological
care required during travel
Subsection (a) specifically addresses the litigation in Tellis. If inperson care were required for protection under the Act, an employee
would not be able to argue that his or her travel is protected by the Act
simply by providing psychological care and reassurance over the
phone to a seriously ill family member. Subsection (b) understandably
falls under “to care for” a family member as it relates to ongoing
medical treatment of a serious illness. The circuits have all concluded
that ongoing medical treatment is an appropriate reason for traveling
under the FMLA.238 However, for clarification reasons, it is still
included in the proposed rule.
Subsection (c) takes into account the need for direct, in-person
care but then provides additional elements that an employee must meet
in order to travel under the FMLA. These requirements are
incorporated to reduce employee abuse resulting from a broad
interpretation under Ballard. For example, an employee’s trip,
regardless if it is a vacation, would be protected under the FMLA only
if a social worker or organization, like Make-A-Wish, organized the
trip on behalf of the employee or seriously ill family member.
238

The Ballard court stated that active treatment is not a prerequisite, but this
infers that active treatment would in fact fall under the FMLA. 741 F.3d 838, 842
(7th Cir. 2014). See also Tellis, 414 F.3d at 1047 (citing Marchisheck, 199 F.3d at
1076). The Tayag court did not address the concept of ongoing medical care, though
Tayag’s employer had consistently approved FMLA leave for medical care in the
past. 632 F.3d 788, 789 (1st Cir. 2011).
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However, travel to accompany a relatively healthy minor child, like in
Marchisheck, would not meet the rule’s requirements.
Applying these criteria would have resulted in the same outcome
in each of the circuits, though for different reasons than the courts’
initial opinions. Tayag, Marchisheck, and Tellis would have denied
relief to the employee because the employee did not organize travel
through an appropriate channel. However, the Seventh Circuit opinion
would have been proper because the Las Vegas trip was organized
through a hospice care program.239 In addition, as long as Ballard
followed the proposed certification procedures, she would have
provided sufficient care to her mother to fall under the FMLA’s
protection.240
B. Preventing Employee Abuse
Despite a potential solution to allowing travel under the FMLA,
the argument remains that employees will find some way to defraud
the system. The Chicago Park District in Ballard used this argument
throughout its briefs.241 If traveling under the FMLA were allowed,
employees could potentially take up to twelve weeks of unpaid
vacation leave annually by simply bringing a seriously ill family
member along on the vacation.242
To prevent further abuse, employers must implement their own
procedures while maintaining compliance with the Act’s requirements.
Employers should also take advantage of all protections that the Act
already provides, such as the need for a completed medical
certification form. The current FMLA certification provision does not
require an employer to request a certification every time before
239

Ballard, 741 F.3d at 843 (“[A]ny worries about opportunistic leave-taking
in this case should be tempered by the fact that this dispute arises out of the hospice
and palliative care context.”).
240
Id. at 839.
241
Brief of Defendant-Appellant at 27, Ballard v. Chic. Park Dist., 741 F.3d
838 (No. 13-1445).
242
Ballard, 741 F.3d at 843.
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granting FMLA leave to an employee.243 However, an employee
should take advantage of this provision and always ask for a
certification before granting FMLA leave.
In addition, the DOL must revise the current medical certification
form to include required information for the proposed new rule. The
form should request information related to who is organizing the trip,
including contact information and the reason for the trip (i.e., last
wishes of the seriously ill family member). The form should also
include a section for a physician to comment on travel plans. This
section should require very specific information related to how the
employee will be providing care, as well as where the care will take
place. This is necessary for two reasons: (1) a description of the
employee’s responsibilities while traveling with the family member
will help the employer determine whether the travel falls under the
traveling regulation; and (2) practically speaking, an employer will be
able to determine how accessible the employee will be for business
purposes should an issue arise and the employer must contact the
employee.
Potential employee abuse is inevitable, even with additional
regulations. However, the above-proposed rule takes significant
guesswork out of whether travel will be protected by the FMLA. It
also imposes obstacles, which an employee must overcome before
receiving FMLA protection, more obstacles than were previously in
place.
C. Furthering Legislative Intent
The FMLA was passed to provide emotional and financial
security to employees in an ever-changing demographic
environment.244 The Act’s legislative history focused on allowing
employees unpaid leave to take care of family members who suffer
from a “serious health condition” and concentrated on traditional
243

29 U.S.C.A. § 2613(a) (2009) (“An employer may require that a request for
leave . . . be supported by a certification . . . .).
244
See H.R. REP. No. 103-8, pt. 1, at 26 (1993).
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values that make up American life. Families have traditionally cared
for their disabled elderly, and marriages are created “in sickness and in
health.”245
Though the FMLA is employee-focused, the Act attempts to also
account for employer needs. Congressional intent behind the FMLA
was to not only reduce stress for employees attempting to balance
family and career, but also to improve business and national
productivity.246 For example, during congressional hearings, Jeanne
Kardos, Director of Employee Benefits for the Southern New England
Telephone Co. (SNET), testified that the company’s current leave
policies were “considered an asset by management and workers
alike.”247 Specifically, the women hired at SNET were highly trained
and had a tremendous amount of job experience.248 The company
invested a lot into their employees, and therefore, the company
believed the FMLA would be cost-effective rather than costly.249
Those highly skilled and trained employees stay at a company that
provides flexibility and contribute to business productivity.250
Similarly, the 1989 General Accounting Office (GAO) studied
legislation similar to the FMLA and concluded that there would be “no
measurable net costs to business from replacing workers or lost
productivity.”251 In fact, the cost to employers nationally would be less
than $236 million annually, primarily to account for health insurance
coverage for employees on leave.252 A 1992 study by the Families and
Work Institute also concluded that providing leave is more costeffective for employers.253 The study found that accommodating leave
averages 20% of the employee’s annual salary as compared to 150%
245
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S. REP. NO. 103-3, at 7 (1993), reprinted in 1993 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3, 9.
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of the employee’s salary in locating, training, and permanently
replacing an employee.254
In reality, employees have continued to reap the benefits of the
FMLA while employers are left to carry the burden of increased costs.
What the GAO estimated to be a $236 million annual cost has
magnified to over $21 billion in 2005 according to the Employment
Policy Foundation (EPF).255 Even with these numbers, proponents of a
broad rule, like the rule applied in Ballard, may state that providing
leave is more cost-effective for employers than permanently replacing
employees who need leave, regardless of whether the leave is for
home care or travel care.
This argument may ring true256 but with more employees taking
leave, indirect costs outweigh the benefits. The EPF's survey found
that FMLA costs primarily consisted of those costs Congress believed
would be negligible. The $21 billion consisted primarily of decreased
profits from lost productivity, group health care benefits (which
Congress originally believed would be the only employer expense),
and costs associated with employee replacement, including additional
wages of those working additional hours to replace employees on

254

Id.
D. Michael Henthorne, FMLA May Cost Employers $21 Billion, LUCAS
COLLEGE & GRADUATE SCH. OF BUSINESS,
http://www.cob.sjsu.edu/malos_s/FMLA%20may%20cost%20employers%20Billion
s%207-29-05.htm (last visited. Apr. 30, 2015). Even more concerning are the
various studies demonstrating the negligible or neutral effects that the Act has had on
businesses. For example, in 2000, the DOL reported that a majority of businesses
found the FMLA had no noticeable effect on their establishments’ productivity,
profitability, and growth. Administering Family and Medical Leave by Covered
Establishments, U.S. DEP’T OF LABOR (2000),
http://www.dol.gov/whd/fmla/chapter6.htm.
256
“Research suggests that direct replacement costs can reach as high as 50%60% of an employee’s annual salary, with total costs associated with turnover
ranging from 90% to 200% of annual salary.” David G. Allen, Retaining Talent,
SHRM FOUND. (2008), available at
http://www.shrm.org/about/foundation/research/documents/retaining%20talent%20final.pdf.
255

383
Published by Scholarly Commons @ IIT Chicago-Kent College of Law, 2015

39

Seventh Circuit Review, Vol. 10, Iss. 2 [2015], Art. 5

SEVENTH CIRCUIT REVIEW

Volume 10, Issue 2

Spring 2015

leave.257 The $21 billion did not include “‘the added administrative
burden employers face in tracking and complying with FMLA leave’
or ‘the secondary economic impact of declining profitability on
economic activity.’”258
In addition, under the current circuit split, lack of clear guidance
on the permissibility of traveling “to care for” a family member under
the FMLA encourages employees to explore limits. This requires
employers—as a means of minimizing their risk exposure for
noncompliance—to adopt policies and processes that in some
instances exceed that which Congress had in mind when it passed the
FMLA. Regulatory uncertainty, as well as broad interpretations of the
Act, provide occasions for employee behavior that may add substantial
indirect costs. These costs include worker resentment of coworkers
taking unfair, but legal, leave; increased absenteeism; increased
administrative and personnel costs; scheduling difficulties; costs of
“filling” in for employees on leave; training potential substitutes for
employees on leave; and overtime pay.259 Further, with the average
defense of an FMLA lawsuit estimated at around $78,000, and
successful suits awarding $87,500 to $450,000 in damages,260 a clearer
rule for approving FMLA leave for travel would reduce unnecessary
litigation expenses for employers. Providing a rule to guide employers
and employees in submitting and approving travel requests may not
return the FMLA to its dual intent—improving employee work-life
balance while increasing employer productivity—but it will prevent
further increased costs to employers.
Should an elderly dependent adult wish to take a vacation but
require the assistance of his adult daughter, an employee should be
257

Henthorne, supra note 255.
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259
Larry F. Darby & Joseph P. Fuhr, Benefits and Costs of the Family and
Medical Leave Act of 1993: A Consumer Welfare Perspective, DARBY ASSOC.
(2007), available at http://www.protectfamilyleave.org/research/darby_fmla.pdf.
260
Allan Compagnon, Presagia’s FMLA Guide: How Well do You Understand
the Intricacies of Compliance?, PRESAGIA (2011), available at
http://www.presagia.com/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/Whitepaper-Presagia-FMLAGuide.pdf.
258
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able to attend to her father’s needs. Caregiving responsibilities are
constant, regardless if an employee is at home or thousands of miles
away from home. An employee cannot carry out these responsibilities
without an employer’s understanding and time off work. However, if
the father wishes to travel once per month, then requests for his
daughter to accompany him places an inevitable strain on the
daughter’s employer. Regardless of the costs to employers, a
consistent theme within the Act and its history is a need for emotional
and financial support of both the employee and his family. The
proposed rule fulfills this support role while enhancing employer
protections, thereby reducing costs. As long as the employee meets the
rule requirements, she is still able to request FMLA leave to
accompany her father on his trip.
CONCLUSION
Under the FMLA, further regulations must be provided
defining “to care for” specifically related to traveling with a seriously
ill family member. An explicit bright line rule, similar to the one
proposed, would reduce ambiguities for employers and employees,
prevent broad interpretations of the Act akin to the Seventh Circuit’s
decision in Ballard v. Chicago Park District, and reconcile the FMLA
with its past legislative intent.
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